

Fraternalism

100/2-A

To: Deputy Military Governor.

1. In his address at Norfolk House on 29th May the Commander-in-Chief asked Chiefs of Divisions to consider the problem of non-fraternisation. This problem had already received consideration in the Control Commission and by Government Departments. The views expressed are summarised in the annexed note and are, in general, contrary to the tendency towards relaxation of non-fraternisation of which the Commander-in-Chief spoke.

2. Reports indicate that the U.S. Commander-in-Chief finds similar difficulties in maintaining a rigid non-fraternisation policy and that the Russian propaganda in many ways encourages fraternisation. It is essential that British policy should be clearly defined at an early date before inter-allied discussions begin.

3. We should clearly either do our best to carry out the instructions of the British Government or we should represent to the Government the necessity for a change in policy. You may wish to take this matter up with the Commander-in-Chief.

Carleton
Secretary

3rd June, 1945

3 June 1945

CONTROL COMMISSION FOR GERMANY (BRITISH ELEMENT)

NON-FRATERNIZATION

(Note by Secretariat)

1. His Majesty's Government's policy is expressed in paragraph 8 of United Kingdom Directive No. 1 "Germany in the Post-Surrender Period" contained in the handbook "Policy Directives for the Allied Commanders-in-Chief", as follows:-

"In general, the attitude to the German population of all forces and agencies under your command or control should be just, but firm and distant. You will strongly discourage fraternization between Allied forces and the German population. In particular, you will reduce to a minimum all contact between forces under your command and German forces not yet demobilised. In general, contact with German officials should be as little as is necessary in order to ensure the adequate supervision of administration."

2. In January 1945 the Armistice and Post War Committee considered a memorandum submitted by the Lord President of the Council stressing the possible unfortunate consequences of the unintelligent interpretation of non-fraternization policy (Appendix "A"). The Committee (a) invited the Lord President to communicate with the Foreign Secretary with a view to the possible discussion of this matter at the meeting between the Heads of Governments and (b) invited the Service Ministers to consider the question of Anglo-German marriages and, if necessary, to bring the matter before the Committee (Appendix "B"). It has been confirmed that nothing was ever done about this and it was not followed up.

3. Following a decision reached at the Deputy Commissioners' Conference 9 Nov 1944 (Conclusion 34(b)) a drafting committee under the Chairmanship of Admiral Sir Francis Tottenham of the Naval Division was set up to prepare a paper on relations with the German population for the guidance of the Commission staffs and occupying forces.

A copy of the paper prepared by this Committee (Appendix "C") was sent by Deputy Commissioner (Military) to Sir F. Bovenschen on 13 Jan 1945 (Appendix "D") requesting that it be considered by the Official Committee on Armistice Terms and Civil Administration and, if approved, by the European Advisory Commission. The Deputy Commissioner (Military) in his letter made it clear that the policy as set out in the paper could not be maintained unless supplemented by the provision on a considerable scale of amenities for the Commission staffs and occupying forces.

4. Sir F. Bovenschen in acknowledging the Deputy Commissioner's (Military) letter stated that the Deputy Commissioner (Military)'s views on leave conditions etc. were matters for the Departments interested and could not be considered to be within the jurisdiction of the Committee.

5. The Official Committee on Armistice Terms and Civil Administration when considering the paper (Appendix "C") on 7 Mar 45 was informed that SHAEF had already issued certain instructions to Army Group Commanders (later embodied in the SHAEF Military Occupation Handbook Chapter XIV) and the Committee left it to the Control Commission to co-ordinate their views and those of Service Departments on this document (Appendix "E") and to obtain any necessary amendments.

6. It transpired that the SHAEF text had been evolved after close consultation with the Adjutant General's Department of the War Office and that the views of the other Service Departments called for but two small additions, one concerning saluting, and the other, the reconciliation of non-fraternization policy with the use of German labour. The secretary of the Official Committee on Armistice Terms and Civil Administration was informed on 31 May that the Commission could not now put the co-ordinated views to SHAEF. Meanwhile the SHAEF document (Appendix "E") is operative.

7. Following the views expressed by the Commander-in-Chief on the present policy of non-fraternization during his talk on 24 May 45 to the Chiefs of Divisions

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the M.G.S. of the Army Division London Planning Staff submitted a memorandum (Appendix "F") making suggestions for overcoming the difficulties anticipated for the troops in preserving the policy of non-fraternization. He emphasised the dangers of modifying policy, at this early stage on the grounds that the Germans would, as in the past, interpret it as a sign of weakness, and that it would draw forth a storm of criticism both from people at home and from all the European Allies. At the same time he appreciates keenly the need for providing the British soldier with some alternative to make up for the loss of home comforts which prolonged non-fraternization would entail, and he makes concrete suggestions for dealing with this by means of regular and frequent leave-spells interspersed with continuous work alleviated by recreational facilities.

Extract from A.P.W.(45)5 dated 11th January, 1945

POLICY IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

Memorandum by the Lord President of the Council and
Deputy Prime Minister

I have received from a responsible source some rather disquieting information as to the carrying out of the non-fraternisation order in occupied Germany. The policy is right, but it should not in my view be interpreted to enjoin the treatment of all Germans as sub-human by occupying troops and an exhibition by them of behaviour indistinguishable from that of the Nazis. I am informed that there has been refusal to give the slightest help to German civilians in order to make for themselves some kind of shelter in devastated areas. Very short notice of evacuation of families from their homes and wanton destruction of furniture etc. is alleged. Attempts of older Trade Unionists to come together have been forbidden.

2. Such a policy will defeat its own ends. It will probably, if known, cause a revulsion to over-tenderness. It will convince the Germans that surrender is no good as life will be unendurable. It will sow the seeds of a future underground war.

3. I should like the Committee to consider whether a more intelligent interpretation of the policy of non-fraternisation should not be communicated to those concerned.

EXTRACT FROM MINUTES OF SECOND A.P.W. MEETING HELD ON 25 JANUARY, '45.

POLICY IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

(A.P.W. (45) 5)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a Memorandum by the Lord President of the Council about the carrying out of the non-fraternisation order in occupied Germany.

MR. ATTLEE said that he had received information that in the U.S. zone the policy of non-fraternisation had been carried out, on some occasions, in a most objectionable manner. He himself favoured the policy of non-fraternisation, but its interpretation in practice was a matter of great difficulty and with far-reaching consequence. If carried out to extremes it was likely to have a very bad effect both on the Germans, who would consider that life was no longer endurable if they were treated by the Allies as being "beyond the pale", and also on the Allied troops whose normal human instincts would revolt against brutality. He realised that this was a matter of great difficulty, but also one of vital importance.

SIR JAMES GRIGG said that the Pre-Surrender Directive for Germany, approved by the Committee and issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to S.C.A.E.F., read as follows:

"The administration shall be firm. It will at the same time be just and humane with respect to the civilian population, so far as consistent with strict military requirements. You will strongly discourage fraternisation between Allied troops and the German officials and population."

S.C.A.E.F. had defined non-fraternisation and promulgated it to the forces under his Command as follows:-

"Non-fraternisation is the avoidance of mingling with the Germans upon terms of friendliness, familiarity or intimacy, whether individually or in groups, in official or unofficial dealings. However, non-fraternisation does not demand rough, undignified or aggressive conduct, nor the insolent overbearance which has characterised Nazi leadership".

There was general agreement that this was an admirable definition of non-fraternisation.

SIR JAMES GRIGG reminded the Committee that the U.S. Government had been at pains to ensure that the conduct of Allied troops in occupied Germany should be very firm, in order to avoid public criticism in America. He understood that some of the views held unofficially in Washington favoured conduct which could hardly be distinguished from that followed by the Nazis. As the Lord President's information apparently referred to conduct in the American zone, the attention of the Supreme Commander could be drawn to the reports and to any specific examples which could be provided. He would, however, prefer not to raise the matter with the Supreme Commander, but to communicate privately with Field Marshal Montgomery as regards conduct in the British zone. Conduct by British troops such as that referred to, if established, might be expected to result in disciplinary action.

SIR ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR agreed entirely with the policy of non-fraternisation and with S.C.A.E.F.'s definition, and emphasised both the importance and the difficulty of seeing that this was correctly carried out. He had recently been informed that S.H.A.E.F. proposed to promulgate an order prohibiting Anglo-German marriages and declaring any that took place to be invalid. He himself entirely agreed with the prohibition of these marriages, but he considered that their invalidation was a matter of high policy about which ministers should be consulted, even though he understood that it was probably legal for S.H.A.E.F. to issue such an order.

/ Mr. LAW ...

MR. LAW said that the information received by the Lord President, which presumed must have come from somebody in S.H.A.E.F., raised the question, among others, of rehabilitation in occupied Germany. This was a very touchy point with the Americans, and in view of all the circumstances, he wondered whether it would not be advisable to raise the matter first with the Americans on a high political level.

In discussion it was generally agreed that the carrying out of the non-fraternisation order was a delicate matter which would have to be taken up with the Americans with great care. There was always the risk that criticism of conduct as being too severe might result in an extreme swing back into sentimentality.

THE COMMITTEE:-

(a) Invited the Lord President to communicate with the Foreign Secretary with a view to the possible discussion of this matter at the meeting between the Heads of Governments;

(b) Invited the Service Ministers to consider the question of Anglo-German marriages and, if necessary, to bring the matter before the Committee.

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.

26th January, 1945.

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APPENDIX 'C'

Final CC for G Version of
DCC/P/22

POLICY AND INSTRUCTIONS ON RELATIONS WITH THE GERMANS
OF ALLIED ARMED FORCES AND CONTROL COMMISSION STAFFS IN THE
INITIAL PERIOD OF CONTROL

PART I - GERMAN MENTALITY AND BEHAVIOUR

Need for a
uniform
code of
conduct.

1. The Germans can appear a gifted, cultivated and kindly people, but experience has shown that they can also commit almost limitless cruelty. Modern civilisation looks back with repugnance to the brutality of the Middle Ages. Yet it is true that the German atrocities in Europe exceed in scale and cruelty anything perpetrated in the Middle Ages. Hence it is desirable that the German character should be understood and a uniform code of conduct prescribed.

Germans
taught
"what is
good for
Germany
is right".

2. It is essential for all members of the Allied forces of occupation and control staffs in Germany to realise that not only officers and men of the German armed forces, but also all German civilians, have been drilled to believe that "all's fair in war", and that war never comes to an end, even during the intervals of time which we call peace. They have been taught that whatever is good for Germany is right, and that a permanent and unceasing struggle between nations for power (Macht) is a law of nature. They have also been taught "blind obedience" (blinder Gehorsam) to their leaders, so that they feel no personal responsibility for carrying out orders of extreme brutality towards their enemies. Hence the appalling record of massacre, torture, shooting of hostages, etc., combined with deliberate starvation of whole populations (e.g. Russian, Polish, Greek) which has disgraced the German name since 1939. The fact that they have not had the opportunity to do the same to Britain and the United States, though they had the will, makes it even more important for representatives of these nations to remember what they have done to their Allies.

No confid-
ence to be
placed in
a German
word of
honour.

3. It follows that, however externally polite or reasonable or trustworthy German officers or civilians may appear to be during the period of occupation, it would be foolish to place any confidence in appearances, and a German's "word of honour" can never be accepted as far as the Commission's work is concerned. Because of their belief in a continuous state of war Germans distinguish sharply between a "sham fight", such as boxing or other sport, and the real thing, the incessant struggle between nations for mastery.

At the same time, most Germans are well aware of the Allies' very different attitude, and of their strong desire for a genuine peace. They will certainly play up to it and try to use it to gain concessions which would make easier their task of preparing for the next struggle, which their leaders are already contemplating.

Two types
of German
behaviour.

4. As a result of these attitudes of mind two different types of German behaviour may be expected. First, concerted attempts at violent resistance may continue under the direction of Nazi or Army Leaders in hiding. Such leaders may attempt to organise guerilla warfare. They may also seek to stir up civil disorders or to

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direct acts of violence or sabotage against Allied persons and Germans who collaborate, or against property. There will also probably be sustained efforts at administrative sabotage (e.g. by obstruction, deliberate misinterpretation of orders, etc.) by Nazis who have camouflaged themselves as anti-Nazis in government or municipal offices.

German attempts to organise sympathy.

5. Secondly, there will probably be attempts by the Germans to organise sympathy again, as they so successfully did after 1918. They will try to explain away their aggressions as reactions against "encirclement" by their neighbours and will place the responsibility for the war on any shoulders but their own. They will do everything to arouse sympathy for their own economic impoverishment without a thought for the miseries of poverty and under-nourishment which they have mercilessly inflicted on others for the past five years.

There is likely, therefore, to be deliberate, studied and continuous effort by the Germans to influence the thoughts and sympathies of the occupying forces and control staffs by propaganda in every possible form. This will be directed against Allied solidarity and towards reducing the period and effectiveness of Allied occupation and control. It will be carried out largely by word of mouth propaganda and attempted fraternisation through personal contacts. Despite Allied control of press and radio, such propaganda can be carried out in Germany and outside the country. It will be widespread and, unless we are prepared, insidious and dangerous.

6. Finally, it must be realised that, in the words of one of their own countrymen, "A people inured to obedience admires, even in its conquerors, nothing but coldness and severity; the nervous character of the German yields before threats, while it interprets a conciliatory attitude as a sign of weakness and cowardice." ¶

PART II

ALLIED POLICY AND ATTITUDE

Population to be made to understand defeat is utter and complete.

7. It will therefore be necessary to make both the German authorities and the German population understand that the German military defeat is utter and complete; that the control of the Allied Powers will be rigorous; and that there is no hope by any subterfuge of any resurgence of German military power.

Rigorous Allied control.

8. The attitude and behaviour of the Allied authority must be such as to give this impression at the start. The object of control, i.e. prevention of a further war and eventual re-education of the German people, will then be attained with less difficulty than would otherwise be the case. The German population will be treated with firmness and cold correctness (see paragraph 6). Allied representatives will so conduct themselves that they command respect for the countries they represent. All orders given will be clear and concise. Any disobedience and evasion on the part of the Germans, and any German action, attitude or remark derogatory to the Allies or an Ally are to be severely dealt with in accordance with the sanctions laid down.

Allied language to be used.

9. The language of the occupying authority will, if so desired, be used in all official business (see Appendix I).

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No salute at
or military
honours to
Germans.

10. It is the policy of the Allies to break up the German military caste. Members of the Allied forces will not salute any German officer or official. No military honours or marks of respect are to be paid to them (see Appendix II).

Germans in
official
positions by
consent of
Occupying
Authority.

11. Germans holding, or appointed to official positions (e.g. administrative, police) will be informed that they hold these by consent or direction of the Occupying Authority and only so long as they conform to that Authority's instructions and requirements.

It is to be borne in mind, however, that it is the intention of the Allied Governments to work through German Authorities. A number of Germans will have to carry out difficult tasks of administration, and they, and others whom the Allies wish to encourage, will need the assurance that they can count on Allied support so long as they comply with Allied policy and orders.

Allied representatives concerned will exercise discretion in dealing with such persons.

Non-fraternisation
with
Germans.

12. A policy of non-fraternisation will be adopted. By this is meant avoidance of mingling with Germans on terms of friendliness, familiarity or intimacy, whether individually or in groups, in official or unofficial dealings. It does not demand undignified, aggressive, ill-mannered conduct and overbearing insolence which has characterised Nazi and German leadership.

The Allied High Command have ordered the Armed Forces that there is to be no hand-shaking with Germans. Contravention of this order is a disciplinary offence. Members of control staffs should conform, bearing in mind, however, both paragraphs 11 and 6. If the German population find that no hand of friendship is extended to them over a period of years it will help to bring home to them the universal horror with which German crimes are viewed. (See Appendix III).

Accommodation
etc.

13. Though no policy of segregation is envisaged, members of occupying forces and control staffs will not be billeted in German homes. Suitable arrangements will be made for their accommodation. The necessary arrangements will also be made for recreation. It must be remembered that the control of Germany will extend over a long period (see Appendix IV).

APPENDIX I

OFFICIAL BUSINESS (See paragraphs 8 and 9)

1. ENGLISH/RUSSIAN/FRENCH, will, as desired, be used in all official business, written and spoken. If the German is unable to speak the language of the Occupying Power, he must bring an interpreter with him, unless security considerations preclude this, when the official Allied interpreter will be used. This interpreter should always be present, even if the Allied officer or official understands German well, or the German interviewed has brought an interpreter with him. Even if bilingual, it is desirable always to speak in one's own language. Allied representatives should, however, learn the German language.

2. Formal orders must be precise and unambiguous; forms of politeness requests, etc., will be omitted. Any disobedience and evasion on the part of the Germans will be promptly and heavily punished.

Ø Delete as necessary.

APPENDIX II

SALUTING, MILITARY HONOURS, ETC.

Members of the Allied Armed Forces will not salute German officers or officials (see paragraph 10).

If on duty as bearers of orders or messages they will come to attention when delivering them.

Salutes by Germans are obligatory in the course of duty with Allied officers or officials.

Salutes given by German officers or officials to Allied officers or officials will be returned.

Guards of honour will not be paraded for German officers or officials.

German officers in uniform will not carry swords or dirks.

German Commanders will not fly their flags on cars or boats.

German Naval officers will not be piped on board any Allied warship.

APPENDIX III

NON-FRATERNISATION

To "shake hands on it" is commonly accepted as "burying the hatchet". Broadly speaking, in civilised communities it signifies a token of friendship. The Germans will endeavour to shake hands on every possible occasion in an attempt to curry favour (see paragraph 5).

Drinking with Germans, visiting German homes, playing games or taking part in sports with Germans and accepting or giving gifts, is not permitted.

German women will be treated with courtesy but behaviour towards them is to be strictly governed by the policy of non-fraternisation.

Subject to the above and to military and security requirements, members of the occupying forces and Control Commission staffs will enjoy freedom of movement and the use of public amenities.

Talking to Germans for the purpose of obtaining services or facilities is not regarded as social intercourse and will be permitted.

APPENDIX IV

LEAVE

Periodical leave to all concerned must certainly engage the attention of the proper authorities. In the initial period of control, families of members will not be permitted to reside in Germany but the situation will be reviewed from time to time and instructions will be rescinded as soon as local conditions permit.

APPENDIX 'D'.

S E C R E T.

From: Major-General S. W. Kirby, C.B., C.I.E., O.B.E., M.C.

CONTROL COMMISSION FOR GERMANY,
(BRITISH ELEMENT),
Norfolk House,
St. James's Square,
LONDON, S.W.1.

HQ/1519/Sec E).

13th January, 1945.

Dear

I am forwarding with this letter a paper on "Relations with the Germans of Allied Armed Forces and Control Commission Staffs in the Initial Period of Control", and request that it may be considered by the A.C.A.O., and, if the A.C.A.O. approves, by the EAC.

The paper recommends a policy of non-fraternization in the strictest sense. It is clear that such a policy, involving virtual segregation of the British forces, cannot be maintained unless it is supplemented by a policy of providing amenities on a considerable scale for the occupying forces and control staffs. Their standard of living, while not extravagant, will need in any case to be appropriate to their prestige as the agents of a victorious nation; the policy proposed above will make it yet more necessary that conditions of leave, recreation, accommodation and transport should be generous enough to compensate for, and make tolerable, the complete cutting off of any social intercourse with the German population, with all that this implies. Thus, in recommending the policy of non-fraternization, it has been assumed that the necessary steps will be taken to ensure that amenities are provided on the required scale; and it is important that the Departments concerned should be aware of the commitments involved.

I feel that these considerations should be brought before the Committee when the paper is being discussed.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Harvey at the Foreign Office.

Yours

(Signed) S. W. KIRBY.

Sir Frederick S. Bovenschen, K.C.B., K.B.E.,
The War Office,
Whitehall, S.W.1.

Copy to: Admiral Sir Francis Tottenham.

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APPENDIX A to
A.C.A.O/P(45)23.

SHAEP MILITARY OCCUPATION HANDBOOK.

CHAPTER XIV

POLICY ON RELATIONS BETWEEN ALLIED OCCUPYING
FORCES AND INHABITANTS OF GERMANY

626. German Attitude and Propaganda

- (a) The German mental attitude during the previous occupation of GERMANY ranged from hatred, through friendliness to fawning subservience. In the coming occupation, all attitudes of mind may be encountered, differing with persons and localities, and changing from time to time. However, because of this war's greater air bombing damage and ground combat within GERMANY, and because of the intense Nazi indoctrination, German hatred may be far deeper and more universal than in 1918. Also, the whole country will be occupied, as compared to only a small fraction in 1918.
- (b) The German conception of themselves as a "Master Race" has been too deeply implanted to be eradicated outright; many Germans will accept defeat as only a temporary phase of a continuing struggle, and strong efforts will no doubt be directed towards regaining a commanding position in EUROPE. Plans for underground continuation of the struggle are believed to exist.
- (c) Aside from initial resistance by any German military forces not immediately under control, the occupying forces must be prepared for civil disorders, including sniping and assaults on individuals, sabotage, provoked riots, perhaps even organised raids. Hidden arms will undoubtedly be available.
- (d) Later there is likely to be deliberate, studied and continuous effort by the Germans to influence the sympathies and thoughts of the occupying forces, with a view to minimizing the consequences of defeat and preparing the way for a resurgence of German power. Propaganda in widely differing forms may be expected. It will probably endeavour to weaken the Allied solidarity; to undermine the Allied determination to exercise supervision and enforce the surrender terms; to induce a reduction in the occupying forces; and to lower Allied morale and military effectiveness.
- (e) While open propaganda through press and radio will probably be ineffective because of Allied supervision, it is expected that word-of-mouth propaganda, under the direction of underground agencies, will be attempted unceasingly by the population wherever it contacts Allied personnel. Its methods will include attempts at fraternization by civilians (especially by children, women, and old men); attempts at "soldier-to-soldier" fraternization; and social, official, and religious contacts. The propaganda may include appeals to generosity and spirit of fair play; appeals to pity for victims of devastation; appeals to racial and cultural similarities between Germans and Anglo-Saxons; organisation of sympathy for an allegedly misled and oppressed people and its starving children; sowing of discord between British and American forces and between them and the Russians; and attempts to prove that Nazism was an alien idea implanted against the general will in the cultured and unaggressive minds of Germans. The propaganda will be universal, insidious, and dangerous, and will require extensive means to avoid and combat it.

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627. General Conduct

- (a) Allied personnel will so conduct themselves in their relations with the inhabitants of GERMANY as to command respect for themselves and for the countries which they represent.
- (b) The Germans, as a nation, hold the armed forces and all things military in deep respect. A high standard of conduct and discipline must therefore be maintained by Allied personnel.
- (c) Acts of violence committed when not in the lawful course of military duty are forbidden, as are acts of pillage and oppression. If such transgressions occur, offenders will be severely punished.

628. Drinking

Strict measures to control the consumption of liquor by Allied personnel will be exercised by commanders. Cases of drunkenness will be firmly dealt with.

629. Non-Fraternization

Definition: "Non-Fraternization" is the avoidance of mingling with Germans upon terms of friendliness, familiarity or intimacy, whether individually or in groups, in official or unofficial dealings. However, non-fraternization does not demand rough, undignified or aggressive conduct, nor the insolent overbearance which has characterized Nazi leadership.

630. General Policy of Non-Fraternization

- (a) There will be no fraternization between Allied personnel and the German officials or population.
- (b) This policy of non-fraternization is necessary in order to emphasize the relationship between the occupation forces and themselves and to circumvent their efforts to defeat the objects of our occupation. They must learn this time that their support and tolerance of militaristic leaders, their acceptance and furtherance of racial hatreds and persecutions, and their aggressions in EUROPE have brought them to complete defeat, and have caused the other people of the world to look upon them with distrust.

631. Attitude toward Germans in Official Contacts

- (a) Allied personnel dealing with Germans on official business will be just, but firm. They will adopt an attitude of stern courtesy. They will make it clear by words and attitude that immediate compliance with orders and instructions will be required and enforced. In official, as in personal matters, there must be no fraternization. The definition laid down in para. 629 above, applies to both.
- (b) Contacts on official matters with Germans, both military and civilian, will be restricted to the minimum necessary to ensure adequate supervision of execution of the surrender terms and other official business. There will be no entertaining, "official" or otherwise.
- (c) Germans holding or appointed to official positions, such as police, administrative or military positions, will be made to understand that they hold office by consent of Allied authorities, and only so long as they conform to Allied instructions and requirements.

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632. Administrative Measures Implementing "Non-Fraternization"

The policy of non-fraternization will be implemented by the adoption of the following measures:-

(a) Segregation in Quarters

The billeting of officers or men in the homes of the population is forbidden. Separate quarters for troops will be obtained by the use of permanent barracks, schools, and other public buildings, by requisition of hotels, private buildings and houses, or by the use of hutted or tented camps. Permanent quarters will be so located as to minimize contact with the German population.

(b) Marriage with Germans or personnel of other enemy countries is prohibited.

(c) Religious Services.

Whenever possible, church services conducted by Allied chaplains will be provided. When this is not possible, attendance at German churches will be permitted; in such cases, separate seating will be provided for the troops.

(d) Restrictions on Contacts

The following must be prohibited; visiting German homes; drinking with Germans; shaking hands with them; playing games or sports with them; giving or accepting gifts; attending German dances or social events; accompanying Germans on the street, in theatres, taverns, hotels, or elsewhere (except on official business); discussions and arguments with Germans, especially on politics or the future of GERMANY.

(e) Execution and Enforcement

Commanders will take energetic action to implement and execute the policies and instructions contained in this section. Uniform enforcement of non-fraternization is especially important throughout GERMANY.

633. Orientation of Troops

Prior to their arrival in GERMANY, Commanders will take all practicable measures to inform their troops as to:-

- (a) The mission of the occupying forces, their attitude towards the German people, and the standard of conduct required of them.
- (b) The characteristics of the German people, their probable attitude towards the forces of occupation, and the types of propaganda which they are liable to employ. Emphasis should be laid upon the necessity for non-fraternization and the means by which this policy is to be effected.

634. Training and Recreation

(a) Policy

The policy of segregation from the civilian population is a difficult one to maintain, entailing as it does considerable sacrifice upon the part of our troops of many of the amenities to which they are accustomed. Every endeavour must be made by Commanders to provide a full and varied programme of training, education and recreation with which to occupy the time of the troops, interspersed by as frequent periods of leave as are permitted by operational conditions.

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(b) Military Training

Military Training must continue as vigorously as practicable and consistent with maintenance of morale. The highest state of discipline and smartness must be attained.

(c) Education

General educational work should be undertaken, to cover subjects of general culture and military or civilian utility (arts, sciences, handicrafts, etc).

(d) Recreation

(1) Recreation under control of Allied forces will be strongly encouraged. All facilities practicable will be provided.

(2) Facilities

Commanders are authorized to take over suitable local entertainment facilities wholly or partly and to prescribe, in accordance with the circumstances of each case:-

(i) Allied attendance at separate hours.

(ii) Exclusive Allied use.

(3) Recreation Centres

Recreation centres ("leave centres"), well organized, staffed and equipped, should be established; preferably outside of GERMANY, where the men will have greater freedom from restraints imposed by non-fraternization. Planning therefore should be initiated shortly after the surrender in order that the centres may be ready early.

(e) Leaves

Initially, the situation will not permit a liberal leave policy. Leaves for over 48 hours' duration will normally be for destinations outside of GERMANY. Neither then nor later will leaves be granted if they entail staying at private houses, hotels, or other establishments controlled by Germans. However, with arrangements for recreation centres and improvement of the military situation, it is expected that the leave policy will be liberalized as soon as practicable. Leaves, however, will still be primarily for destinations outside of GERMANY, to leave centres or to home countries.

(f) Women's Services

It is desirable that, as early as the situation permits, the Women's Services, whether belonging to the forces, or of a voluntary character (Red Cross, YMCA, etc) should be included in the occupying forces, and in relatively large numbers.